South Sudan's ruling elites thrive on a cycle of instability, a strategy that has kept the country in a perpetual state of crisis since its independence in 2011. This approach is not a mere coincidence but a deliberate governing method. The promise of elections, a permanent constitution, and a unified state has been consistently postponed, often framed as technical issues or security concerns. In reality, these delays are integral to the ruling elite's survival strategy.
The absence of a general election for over a decade and the ongoing delay of a permanent constitution are not mere administrative setbacks. They are carefully orchestrated to maintain control. The ruling elite understands that formal institutions are not the primary source of authority; instead, it lies in informal networks that connect the presidency, security services, oil revenues, and ethnic patronage. These networks thrive in ambiguity, as clear rules would limit their discretion and introduce risks.
The security sector exemplifies this informal core. South Sudan's national army is, in practice, a coalition of forces loyal to individuals rather than institutions. The failure to unify these forces under the peace agreement is not a logistical oversight but a calculated move to protect elite survival. A unified army would require regulated promotions, budgets, and authority, which would disrupt the current system of selective rewards, defections, and calibrated violence.
Similarly, oil revenues, accounting for 90% of government income and 95% of exports, flow through opaque channels. The damage to the oil pipeline in 2024, for instance, significantly reduced production, causing fiscal collapse for the population but not for the ruling elite. This instability becomes a resource rather than a liability, increasing dependence on informal extraction, illicit taxation, and aid diversion.
Economic fragility reinforces this system. With four out of five South Sudanese living below the poverty line, inflation surged in late 2024, and youth unemployment hovers around 50%. Yet, most households survive through subsistence farming, casual labor, or informal trade, limiting collective pressure for reform while maintaining vulnerability to local coercion.
The ruling elite also governs through instability by managing civil society rather than empowering it. While South Sudan has an active civic space on paper, civil society is fragmented, co-opted, and selectively repressed. Organizations that align with elite narratives are tolerated or funded, while those that mobilize independently face harassment, deregistration, or worse, resulting in a civil society that appears active but rarely threatens power.
Elections, a cornerstone of democratic governance, are another arena where South Sudan's sociopolitical dynamics are perfectly captured. Surveys show a strong desire to vote, but fear of discussing politics and voting itself is prevalent. This contradiction benefits the ruling elite, as it can cite popular demand for elections to donors while ensuring shallow mobilization, keeping elections permanently 'in preparation'.
Customary authorities are also drawn into this logic. Traditional courts resolve most disputes, and chiefs and elders often command more trust than state institutions. Instead of integrating these structures into accountable governance, elites instrumentalize them, framing communal violence as local and cultural, even when national actors incite it. This allows the center to deny responsibility while benefiting from the disorder.
A persistent humanitarian crisis further perpetuates this cycle. In 2025, nearly 60% of the population is projected to face crisis-level food insecurity, and over 5 million people need water and sanitation support. Maternal mortality rates are alarmingly high. These conditions should provoke political rupture, but they are normalized, with aid filling gaps just enough to prevent collapse, while funding shortfalls ensure widespread suffering.
Regional woes, such as spillovers from Sudan's war, disrupt trade, damage oil infrastructure, and bring new arms and fighters across the border. Regional mediation continues but with declining influence, as international actors press for timelines and benchmarks without enforcement power. This suits the ruling elite, who trade compliance rhetoric for time, extensions, and diplomatic patience.
Ultimately, governing through instability ties elite survival to the persistence of crisis. Violence justifies emergency powers, delays justify rule extensions, and fragmentation justifies repression. Peace is constantly invoked but only as a promise deferred. National unity is rhetorically celebrated while being structurally impossible under the current system.
This is why South Sudan feels perpetually on the edge. The danger is not just another war but a political order that ensures war remains possible but never decisive. Instability avoids exposing corruption, redistributing power, and forcing accountability. South Sudan may not collapse tomorrow, but unless the logic of governing through instability is challenged, violence will remain a useful tool, and the country will remain ready for it.
